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 ABSTRACT  
 
STATISTICAL METHODS USED FOR INTRUSION DETECTION 
 
Computer networks are being attacked everyday. Intrusion detection systems are 
used to detect and reduce effects of these attacks. Signature based intrusion detection 
systems can only identify known attacks and are ineffective against novel and unknown 
attacks. Intrusion detection using anomaly detection aims to detect unknown attacks and 
there exist algorithms developed for this goal. In this study, performance of five 
anomaly detection algorithms and  a signature based intrusion detection system is 
demonstrated on synthetic and real data sets. A portion of attacks are detected using 
Snort and SPADE algorithms. PHAD and other algorithms could not detect 
considerable portion of the attacks in tests due to lack of sufficiently long enough 
training data . 
 v
 ÖZET  
 
SALDIRI TESPİTİ İÇİN İSTATİSTİKSEL YÖNTEMLERİN 
KULLANIMI 
 
Her gün bilgisayar ağlarına yönelik saldırılar gerçekleşmektedir. Saldırı tespit 
sistemleri bu saldırıları tespit edip etkilerini azaltmak için kullanılmaktadır. İmza 
temelli saldırı tespit sistemleri, sadece bilinen saldırıları tanımlayabilmekte, bilinmeyen 
ve yeni saldırılar karşısında etkisiz kalmaktadır. Anormallik tespiti ile saldırı tespiti 
yöntemleri bilinmeyen saldırıları tespit etmeyi hedeflemektedir ve bu amaca yönelik 
geliştirilmiş algoritmalar mevcuttur. Bu çalışmada beş anormallik tespiti algoritması ve 
imza tabanlı bir saldırı tespit sistemi olan Snort’un, sentetik ve gerçek veri kümeleri 
üzerinde test edilip başarımlarının gösterilmesi hedeflenmiştir. Snort ve SPADE 
algoritmaları kullanılarak saldırıların bir bölümü tespit edilebilmiştir. PHAD ve diğer 
algoritmalarda ise testlerde yeteri kadar uzun eğitim verisi olmaması sebebiyle 
saldırıların önemli bir bölümü tespit edilememiştir. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Computers and Internet has become an ordinary and indispensable reality of life 
for many people. This trend makes people use facilities on-line with an increasing rate. 
This widespread usage has made Internet a new market for enterprises, a place to share 
and exchange information for researchers, source of entertainment and recreation. 
Widespread use and benefits of online resources have also attracted people who would 
like to benefit more than others with use of illegal methods. These people have 
exploited vulnerabilities in systems sometimes for benefit, sometimes for satisfying 
their curiosity only. In 1988, Morris Worm (WEB_1 2006) epidemic have caused to 
stop 10% of servers connected to Internet. Even though size and use of Internet was 
small at the time, economic and social impact was greater. Morris worm may be thought 
as a starting point for a new era. Attacks increased by time and this increase 
introduction of security mechanisms, precautions and development of software patches 
to remove vulnerability. Increased security precautions introduced new attack methods 
and exploitation of new vulnerabilities. Loop of improved security precautions and 
attacks Figure 1.1 shows number of reported incidents to CERT/CC between 1994 and 
2003 (WEB_2 2006). 
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Fig.1.1. CERT/CC reported incidents by year 
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According to an annual survey (CSI 2005), total financial loss due to security 
incidents have been around $130M in 2005. 95% of the participants have experienced 
more than 10 web site incidents last year. Moreover, a majority of 73% has not reported 
the incident.  
On the other hand, use of some of basic security tools has become very common, 
such as firewalls (97%), anti virus software (96%) and intrusion detection systems 
(72%) according to the report. Firewalls and anti virus software are applied as first line 
of defense against external attacks. Deploying and running intrusion detection systems 
may be considered as second line of defense, but it is obvious that they are also a 
popular solution, but not widely accepted. 
Attacks which exploit recently discovered vulnerabilities have more impact than 
older attacks, since a software patch is released by software vendors to remove for a 
known attack and is applied by security-aware administrators. Unknown attacks have 
more chance on defeating deployed security solutions. Traditional systems usually fail 
on detecting unknown attacks, since their success rates heavily rely on description of 
attacks. One way to describe or detect them is using anomalies happened on the 
systems. These undiscovered attacks can create anomalies in systems. If the anomalies 
caused by attacks can be discovered when they occurred; precautions may be taken 
much earlier before attack becomes widely known. Detecting, or at least being informed 
about unknown attacks provide a significant increase in security. Anomaly detection 
algorithms may help discovering attacks using anomalies due to the attacks on the 
system, without describing them and increasing overall security.  
Uses of anomaly detection for detecting hostile activity have been studied for a 
long time. There are anomaly detection algorithms and tools developed for detecting 
intrusions, both in commercial and academic research sites. However, commercial 
products are not tested in laboratory environment with scientific metrics. Even though 
result of anomaly detection algorithms sounds promising environment, most of them are 
not tried in harsh environment of real networks. Lack of being tested in real 
environments may be misleading for detection performance. For commercial products, 
even though there exists evaluations, but almost none of these make sense in a scientific 
way. This is a handicap for revealing real performance of commercial systems. In this 
study a set of anomaly detection algorithms and commercial products were tested using 
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synthetic and genuine real time datasets and results are discussed with comparison of 
their performance.  
Remainder of this dissertation is as follows, starting from Chapter 2: 
In Chapter 2, concepts of security, intrusion, intrusion detection and anomaly 
detection are described with their goals. In addition, tools and evaluation material are 
described. 
In Chapter 3, algorithms that are to be evaluated in this study are introduced with 
their background. 
In Chapter 4, introduces process of data collection operation from Izmir Institute 
of Technology campus servers.  
In Chapter 5, processes of evaluation of algorithms are explained with sufficient 
detail of evaluation environment, configuration and modifications and operation. 
In Chapter 6, findings on collected data are introduced. Similarities and 
significant differences between available datasets and other datasets are discussed in 
detail. Results of demonstration process are compared and discussed with each other 
and previous studies. 
Chapter 7 summarizes our main findings and advantages and disadvantages of 
described algorithms in practice. It also points out our limitations and further research 
issues. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INTRUSION DETECTION 
 
 
2.1. Overview 
 
Computers and computer networks have become quite common in use for people 
in modern world. Many services and information sources provided online such as online 
encyclopedias, informational web-pages, directory listings, newsgroups, email, and 
online shopping sites are accessed and extensively used by millions of people everyday. 
However, not every user wishes to benefit from these sites and services, there are people 
who try to abuse people, services and enterprises. 
 
2.2. Definition and Goals 
 
This is the point where computer security concept is introduced. Computer 
security may be defined as “generic name for collection of tools designed to protect 
computer systems” (Stallings 2003). It consists of three characteristic properties of the 
system to be protected. These three goals are defined as (Pfleeger 1997): 
Confidentiality: Confidentiality means the assets of a computing system are 
accessible only by authorized parties. This asset may contain any information not only 
limited to data and permissions, but also may contain existence of a fact about system or 
the data on the system. This term is also referred to as privacy or secrecy. In further 
parts of the text these terms are used interchangeably. 
Integrity: Integrity means that assets can be modified by only authorized parties 
or only in authorized ways. 
Availability: Availability means that assets are accessible to authorized parties. 
Availability of an object (or service) includes its presence, capacity to meet service 
needs, bounded waiting times, timeliness of service. 
 
An attack or intrusion may be defined as any set of actions that attempt to 
compromise confidentiality, integrity and availability of a resource (Heberlein et 
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al.1991), which may be simply stated as violation of the three goals. Sometimes the 
term penetration is used instead of intrusion. 
Attackers, who attack on computer systems, are also referred to as intruders. Attacker 
and intruders are also used interchangeably. However not all attackers are humans, 
viruses and worms may be accepted as attacker, since their goals and activities are 
similar to their human counterparts. 
Intrusion Detection is, in its simplest form, a set of tools, methods and activities 
to detect violations of security goals. Intrusion Detection System will gather information 
from monitored system or network and provide information to human analyst, about 
suspicious activity, which also may include intrusions. Intrusion Detection is interested 
detecting intrusions and being aware. Intrusion Prevention extends Intrusion Detection 
and includes countermeasures against attackers and their activities. 
 
2.2.1. Taxonomy of Attacks 
 
All attacks are not the same; they may be classified into five main groups according to 
targeted security goals. (Lippmann et al. 2000b) describes the taxonomy of attacks: 
Probes: These attacks automatically scan a network of computers or a DNS 
server to find valid IP addresses, active ports, host operating system types, and known 
vulnerabilities. 
Denial of Service Attacks: Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are designed to 
disrupt availability of a host or network service. 
Remote to Local Attacks: On a Remote to Local (R2L) attack, an attacker who 
does not have an account on a victim machine gains local access to the machine, 
exfiltrates files from the machine, or modifies data in transit to the machine. 
User to Root Attacks: User to Root (U2R) attacks where a local user on a 
machine 
is able to obtain privileges normally reserved for system administrators. 
Data Attacks: goal of a Data attack is to exfiltrate special files which the 
security policy specifies should remain on the victim hosts.  
 
Probe attacks are more widely applied than other methods, because of their 
reconnaissance-nature activities on potential victims. 
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2.2.2. Taxonomy of Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
Intrusion detection systems are classified into groups according to their data 
sources, methods of detection and response times. 
 
2.2.2.1. Classification of Intrusion Detection Systems by Data Source 
 
These systems use different data sources and usually installed on different 
locations to operate:  
 
2.2.2.1.1. Host Based Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
Host based intrusion detection system (HIDS) works on a single host, using 
different sources of information such as security audit logs, event logs, file hashes, 
registry traces etc. Application based intrusion detection systems are a special subset of 
this group, since they use host available only to the host they are installed and an data 
source is an application installed on that system, other than data sources provided by 
operating system facilities. 
 
2.2.2.1.2. Network Based Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
Network based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) works by analyzing network 
activity on the network. In its simplest forms a network tap, which is usually another 
computer, is installed and all network activity passing, inbound, outbound or both 
directions is logged or analyzed. Most commercial systems fall into this category. 
There is also a subset of network based intrusion detection, named Network 
Node Intrusion Detection. (Crothers 2003) describes Network Node Intrusion Detection 
using its working principle: “This system works by analyzing network traffic like 
standard network based intrusion detection does. But rather than attempting to monitor 
all network traffic, a network node IDS analyzes only network traffic specified for it”. 
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2.2.2.2. Classification of Intrusion Detection Systems by Method of  
             Detection 
 
Intrusion Detection Systems may be classified according to the methods used for 
detecting potential malicious activity. Two common and general methods exist, and 
have different strong and weak sides. 
 
2.2.2.2.1. Signature Based Intrusion Detection 
 
 Signature based Intrusion detection systems rely on a set of rules (also known as 
signatures) for detecting intrusion activity. A signature can be described as a conditional 
rule, which is tested on an instance of activity, identifying a specific type (Cole et al. 
2005). This instance may be an incoming network packet, streaming traffic flow, 
specific set of keywords or activities on a monitored system, lines of log records and 
lists of commands or sequence of system calls. For example, in the network packet case, 
an incoming packet to a network IDS may be checked against a set of rules for matching 
content. Matching operation usually includes comparisons of binary or text data using 
regular expressions. A signature can be used to detect intrusions or policy violations 
where applicable. Signature based detection may help previously known and modeled 
attacks. For undiscovered attacks, which is also known as “zero-day attacks”, they are 
usually useless. 
 
2.2.2.2.2. Anomaly Detection 
 
 Anomaly detection is not opposite of signature based detection, a supportive 
complement instead. Anomaly detection creates a norm model characterization for 
monitored activities using acquired data, such as connection durations, incoming or 
outgoing traffic rates, frequency of commands etc. Any event which is identified as 
deviant or anomalous according to this model is stamped as hostile or anomalous (Cole 
et al. 2005). This method can be used to detect not only known attacks, but also 
promises to detect unknown attacks. This scheme may be useful for detecting unknown 
attacks and to achieve a lower false negative rate. Anomaly detection systems may not 
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provide much information about attacks or their nature, since they are identified by their 
anomalous nature, not a signature. 
 
2.2.2.3. Classification by Processing and Response Time 
 
 A real time intrusion detection system can process data, determine existence of a 
suspected attack and respond or report in real time. This is most common approach and 
preferred, but not the only one. Another approach, off-line processing, is determining 
whether an attack was made in a separate time, probably using a different system. This 
may be preferred in cases of manual inspection, aggregation with other data, or 
existence of post-processing on data. 
 
2.2.3. Background on Anomaly Detection 
 
An anomaly is something unusual, unexpected or a form of deviation from a pre-defined 
standard rule, theory or measurement (WEB_3 2006). It may be an event happened or a 
value measured by some sort of experiment or device. Existence and definition of 
anomaly requires existence of some standard, which may be built on conventions or 
experiments. A snow storm between two sunny days in summer is possible, but if it 
happens, this event can be considered as anomalous.  
 
2.2.3.1. Norm 
 
Concept of anomaly rises from standards and expectations. Measurable quantities of 
events can be used to construct models and calculate statistics. Probability distribution 
of commands on a remote login connection of a home-office worker of some company, 
or distribution of some measurable information transferred on page requests from a 
server may be measured and a norm, a standard may be formed (Stallings 2003).  
 
2.2.3.2. Attack 
 
Deviation from a norm may be coincidental event; it may be tolerable up to some 
threshold level. Home-Office user may start using different commands with different 
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frequency, or page requests for server are significantly changed for some measurable 
time. These events may be signs of hostile activity, because of their deviations from 
norm, or vice versa. An anomaly may point a hostile activity. The old and the new 
activity profiles may overlap or may differ significantly. Deviations from the norm 
profile may be detected and can be signed as hostile (Stallings 2003).  
 
2.2.4. Criteria on Evaluating Performance of Intrusion Detection  
          Systems 
 
 Success rate of an intrusion detection system depends on a few criteria, each of 
which is not sufficient to be authoritative. 
High detection rate is the most important goal of an intrusion detection system. 
A good system should have high rates of detection with a relative false alarm rate. False 
alarm rate becomes a limiting factor (Axelsson 1999).  
 Intrusion detection systems should bring minimal computational overhead to the 
systems which they are run. Computational overhead can affect overall performance of 
system. In network based systems case, high load on NIDS increases rate of dropped 
packets, which will result as lowered detection rates. 
 An intrusion detection system should be able to identify an attack with high rate 
of accuracy. It also should be able to inform analysts about success and possible losses, 
such as compromised systems or data. 
 An intrusion detection system should be able to correlate different events and 
alerts to provide a big picture of overall attack, such as existence of a distributed attacks 
or disguising attackers.  
 Attackers and attack methods evolve as intrusion detection technology evolves. 
Development of new attacks and evasion techniques increases false negative rate of 
systems. An ideal system should be able to detect unknown attacks. Signature based 
systems usually fails this criteria, whereas anomaly detection scheme is considered 
more favorable. 
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2.3. Related Work 
 
 Intrusion detection has become a daily reality for many enterprise network 
system managers. Rise of Internet’s user base around the world, people joining to cyber 
world has brought risks for organizations. Intrusion detection aims to address these 
risks.  
Concept of intrusion detection, terms of audit trails and user activity have 
emerged by (Anderson 1980). Anderson actually wrote the report for a government 
organization and suggested using computer audit trails to understand user behavior and 
detect computer misuses. 
 Most commonly deployed commercial systems are signature based over the 
world. Heuristic approaches are also used in commercial products but did not become 
either common or popular. There are intrusion detection algorithms and systems 
developed previously, some of which date before 1999. These relatively older and 
fundamental systems are discussed in (Axelsson 2000). 
 
2.3.1. Signature Based Approaches 
 
 Most widely known of signature based intrusion detection system is Snort 
(Roesch 1999) and Bro (Paxson 1998), looking for attack signatures on monitored 
traffic. Snort is used to test one of the algorithms in integration with signature detection 
and is introduced in Section 2.6. 
 SHADOW (WEB_4 2006) is another intrusion detection system, provided 
freeware, is a set of useful scripts and programs. SHADOW has a manual and offline 
approach on intrusion detection, since system generates hourly reports of suspected 
traffic, to be inspected by analysts. It has been introduced in textbooks for educational 
purposes until Snort became widely available. 
 
2.3.2. Learning Based Detection Techniques 
 
 Second part of intrusion detection realm, statistical based intrusion detection, is 
formalized in (Denning 1987). The model described includes signature detection, use of 
statistical moments etc.  
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(Cabrera et al. 2000) has used Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to detect DoS and 
probing attacks in addition to detecting attack telnet traffic with attack patterns are 
statistically different from ordinary connections. They used DARPA 1998 evaluation 
data. 
 Statistical Packet Anomaly Detection Engine (SPADE) (Hoagland 2000) 
examines network and transport layer data for rare and anomalous events. SPADE 
algorithm is introduced in 3.5 and evaluated in this study in integration with Snort. 
(Bykova et al.2001) has tested anomalous activity for protocol specifications, 
such as packet headers and allowed values, address spaces and their possible reasons for 
intrusions. This type of anomaly detection is also called as strict anomaly detection. 
(Ye and Chen 2001, Ye et al. 2001, Ye et al. 2002) have used various univariate 
and multivariate statistical tests to detect R2L attacks in IDEVAL data using BSM 
module logs of Solaris operating system. 
Mahoney and Chan have developed a set of anomaly detection algorithms 
named Packet Header Anomaly Detection (PHAD) (Mahoney and Chan 2001), 
Application Layer Anomaly Detection (ALAD) (Mahoney and Chan 2002a), Learning 
Rules for Anomaly Detection (LERAD) (Mahoney and Chan 2002b) and Network 
Traffic Anomaly Detector (NETAD) (Mahoney and Chan 2003c). These algorithms 
used time based modeling and protocol modeling. 
(Aydin and Orencik 2005) has improved PHAD’s anomaly detection capability 
using different values for time factor of PHAD and used this modified algorithm in 
integration with Snort. (Yin et al. 2005) have used genetic programming based rule 
learning approach on LERAD to improve performance of LERAD.  
(Kruegel and Vigna 2003) has used an anomaly detection algorithm on web 
server request query attributes, calculating anomaly scores  which are derived from 
probability vales associated with query attributes.  
(Shon et al. 2005) have used genetic algorithms search technique to select 
features and support vector machine (SVM) machine learning methods to detect 
intrusions, using different data sources.  
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2.4. IDEVAL Data Set 
 
Evaluating performance of an intrusion detection system or an algorithm in 
terms of detecting and missing intrusions is not an easy task. Even though it is ideal to 
test systems in a real environment, this method has its own problems such as privacy of 
communication between peers, repeatability of events and uncontrollable nature of 
events, existence of non-typical traffic or availability of unknown attack methods.  
DARPA/MIT Lincoln Labs. Intrusion Detection Systems Evaluation Data Set 
(IDEVAL) is one of the leading tools for evaluating measuring and comparing 
performance of intrusion detection systems. Offline datasets contain synthetic 
background traffic and labeled attacks. There are two offline evaluation datasets: 1998 
and 1999.  
The DARPA 1998 Intrusion Detection Evaluation was an initial attempt to 
perform a comprehensive evaluation of intrusion detection technology. It was designed 
to evaluate only DARPA funded intrusion detection technology and not complete 
deployable intrusion detection systems (Lippmann et al. 2000b). 
1999 Evaluation and offline datasets have significant improvements on 1998 
evaluation in terms of network structure, evaluation scoring criteria and attack patterns. 
All datasets are published and can be downloaded from (WEB_5, 2006). 
 
2.4.1. Design of IDEVAL Simulation Environment 
 
There are three major design principles of the evaluation. These are: 
1) A Standalone network testbed was used to generate simulation environment 
2) Intrusion Detection Systems’ performance was measured using both attack 
detection rate and false alarm rate 
3) An offline evaluation format allowed many systems to be evaluated and 
supported intrusion detection researchers with examples of background traffic 
(Haines et al. 2001). 
1998 simulation environment aimed to simulate live traffic similar to traffic that 
flows between the inside and outside Internet of a United States Air Force Base. In 1998 
evaluation there are 3 victim UNIX hosts running Linux, Sun OS and Solaris operating 
systems, providing different services to users in and out of the base. 1999 evaluation 
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one more server is added to testbed network, which runs Windows NT. There are two 
sniffers on both side of the router, recording all traffic coming to router from the side 
where it is located.  
For evaluation, file system dumps are collected in addition to audit data collected 
from Solaris and Windows NT servers. Structure of the testbed network is simple 
enough to demonstrate capabilities of the technology. (Lippmann et al. 2000a) declares 
that this network architecture is not representative of an Air Force base.  It is a minimal 
network designed to support intrusion detection systems that desired to participate in 
1998 and 1999, attack types of interest and most of the network traffic types seen across 
many Air Force bases (Lippmann et al. 2000a). 
 
2.4.2. Traffic Generation 
 
There are two types of traffic simulated in the network: normal background 
traffic and attack patterns which are expected to be detected.  
Normal background traffic was statistically compatible with traffic of an Air 
Force base in terms of people’s web and other habits, used words in mails, traffic types 
and rates, frequency of words in documents. These statistics were collected from more 
than fifty bases were included.  
 There are two traffic generators in both inside and outside internets. Generator 
outside simulates thousands of sites and workstations accessed by clients in the base. 
Inside traffic generator simulates users inside the base with different activity profiles. 
These two generators have specific implementations in operating system kernel 
developed and tuned for the simulation. Figure 2.1 shows network structure diagram of 
network used for evaluation. 
Attacks were executed by automated scripts, collected from different sources on 
the Internet. Some of exploits are specifically modified to evade detection (Das 2000). 
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Fig. 2.1.Network structure diagram of 1999 evaluation 
                                        (Source: Haines et al. 2001) 
 
2.4.3. Attack Scenarios 
 
1999 Evaluation Data Set consists of five weeks of data. First three weeks are 
training data, where fourth and fifth are provided for testing purposes. First and third 
weeks’ traffic is attack free, but second week has some labeled attacks. Fourth and fifth 
weeks contain attacks in different numbers, times and diversity. Table 2.1 shows names, 
types, targets and numbers of attacks. Numbers in parentheses next to attack types are 
number of attack instances which fall into that category. Numbers in cells are number of 
applicable attacks which fall into that category: 
 
Table 2.1.Number and categorization of attacks according to attack  
                                  types, victims and number of instances of each attack group  
                                  (Summarized from original source: Haines et al. 2001) 
 
 DoS(65) Probe(37) R2L(56) U2R(37) Data(13) 
Solaris 8 2 6 4 1 
WindowsNT 4 2 5 4 1 
Sun OS 6 2 2 1  
Linux 11 4 9 3 1 
Cisco 1 2 1   
All OS  3    
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Details of attacks and discussion about traces, signatures and effects are 
explained thoroughly in (Kendall 1999) and (Marchette 2001). 
In the evaluation, two attacker profiles are considered: 
First profile is an amateur, relatively unsophisticated, testing his/her skills and 
probably has no specific goals in mind. He uses attack scripts collected from different 
public sources on Internet. Actually these type of attackers are known as “script-kiddie” 
in security community.  Second profile is a more professional one, probably a “black 
hat”, with specific goals in mind and equipped with more skills, may attempt to gain 
some information from the system or deny service for some time. This experienced and 
skilled attacker has ability to modify existing attack scripts where needed, in addition to 
create attacks from scratch, and capability to evade detection by means of using time 
and his coding ability.  
 
2.4.4. Critics and Discussion of IDEVAL Data Sets 
 
(McHugh 2000) has published an article criticizing 1998 evaluation and dataset. 
He has focused criticism on 1998 evaluation. By the time 1999 evaluation was 
underway and some of the ambiguous points in evaluation have not been revealed then. 
Some of the ambiguous points have been revealed and problems discussed are 
addressed in (Das 2000) and (Haines et al. 2001). 
McHugh criticizes evaluation and data set under following titles: 
Goals: Consistency of achieving goals in evaluation 
Background data: Content and generation, similarity of simulated and real 
background traffic. 
Attack Data: Realistic distribution of attacks distributed among background 
traffic in both number and taxonomic classification. For example U2R attacks are the 
most common in evaluation however probes and DoS attacks are more common in real 
world. 
Testbed Network: hypothetical air force base network domain (eyrie.af.mil) has 
ambiguities on number and properties of client hosts. 
(Mahoney and Chan 2003b) have compared attack free data of 1999 evaluation 
data set network traffic properties with real network traffic collected from their 
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departmental servers in a few months period. They have discovered some simulation 
artifacts useful for testing anomaly detection algorithms. 
These simulation artifacts, which may result on making accurate estimations on 
accuracy of anomaly detection algorithms, are summarized as follows: 
Regularity in Simulation: Regularity and limited diversity of TCP options in 
simulation traffic 
Diversity in Packet Header Fields: Packet fields such as Type of Service 
(TOS) and Time to Live (TTL) take more diverse values in real time traffic. 
Crud Packets: There are packets observed where checksums are correct but 
some of protocol specifications violated, such as nonzero values in reserved 
fields. 
HTTP Requests: HTTP Requests in IDEVAL are generally in “GET url 
HTTP/1.0” form, followed by optional commands and “keyword:value” pairs in 
first 200 bytes of first data packet. Diversity is limited in these keywords and 
commands in simulation.  
SMTP Requests: Sessions in simulation are always beginning with HELO and 
EHLO with 3 and 24 different arguments respectively. In real traffic, more 
distinct arguments have been observed.  
SSH Requests: Client version is only of one type in IDEVAL, real traffic traces 
have shown that this is not the case. 
These measurements may be counted as a single observation; hence it is not a 
good idea to use these results as authoritative, but informative and insightful.  
Another critic on IDEVAL data sets are based on self similarity of IDEVAL 
traffic rates has been made by (Allen and Marin 2003). Their study show that self 
similarity models of network traffic fails at night. More details of these two studies are 
explained in 2.5. 
 
2.5. Modeling Behavior of Network Traffic 
 
 Modeling network traffic and its properties using existing statistical models have 
become an interest for people. There are models and technologies developed according 
to these models. Network activities were assumed to happen randomly, for sake of 
simplicity, for example a set of computers, all of which use the same medium as 
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common access channel, instance of transmission for a frame by these computers was to 
be modeled with Poisson distribution (Tanenbaum 1996). Another similar case is valid 
for modeling the process of arrivals, a Poisson process, which interarrival times of 
events are independent (Allen 1997).  However empirical evidence by (Paxson and 
Floyd 1995, Leland et al. 1994) has shown that this is not be the exact case. Leland 
shows pictorial evidence of self similarity using five different time scales of self 
similarity of network traffic and compares with graphical models of Poisson distribution 
for the same scales. Self similarity means that an object looks roughly the same on any 
scale (WEB_6 2006). Fractals are of this type of objects. For indicating self similarity of 
an object, Hurst parameter (denoted as H) is used. Hurst parameter of an object is 1 is if 
it is completely self similar, 0.5 when it has a Poisson distribution. H=0 means the 
object is not self similar. Shown that network traffic is self similar, it also implies that 
events in network are not independent, revealing a long range dependency. Floyd and 
Paxson have verified these results, by denying Poisson modeling, calling for a new 
method of modeling. However they also show that telnet session arrivals can be 
modeled using Poisson.  
 In another study made by (Paxson and Floyd 97), discusses issues in creating a 
simulation of a network and network traffic. There exist many parameters to consider 
for creating such type of simulation but a few of them are explained there with possible 
coping strategies. 
 
2.6. Snort Intrusion Detection System 
 
Snort is a lightweight intrusion detection system developed by (Roesch 1999, 
WEB_7 2006). It is an evolving system publicly available with GNU General Public 
License. In early versions Snort had limited functionality on limited number of 
platforms, however now it is supported and used on more platforms with increased 
functionality and effectiveness.  
In addition it has been quite popular in computer security community, due to its 
functionality, affordability (cost effective solution), widely applicable for various 
environment and purposes, and publicly available supportive material and community. 
Many textbooks on intrusion detection provide examples using Snort.  
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2.6.1. Structure and Operational Properties of Snort 
 
Snort uses libpcap in three of its four modes. Libpcap (WEB_8 2006) a software 
library designed and used to capture packets from specified network interfaces on the 
system.  
Snort has four operational modes which may serve different purposes (Sourcefire 2006): 
• Sniffer mode, which is simply reading the packets from network and displaying 
them in a continuous stream on the console 
• Packet Logger mode, which logs the packet contents to disk. 
• Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) mode is the most complex and 
configurable configuration, which allows Snort to analyze network traffic for 
matches against a user-defined rule set and performing several actions  
• Inline Mode: In this mode, Snort receives packets from iptables (WEB_9 2006) 
instead of libpcap interface and then causes iptables to drop or pass packets 
based on Snort rules that use inline-specific rule types. Iptables is a mechanism 
and tool used to modify packet filtering mechanism of Linux kernel. 
 
2.6.1.1. Snort Rules 
 
Rules as detection technique, is both the strong and the weak point of Snort. A 
simple Snort rule consists of two logical sections : “rule header” and “rule options”: 
 Header section consists of four parts:  
• action (alert, log, etc.),  
• protocol (tcp, udp, etc.), 
• source and destination (in terms of IP address and port) 
Rule options section specifies descriptive features on hostile packets such as portion 
of application payload content or some fields in packet headers. A simple rule for a 
fictional attack is given in Fig. 2.2 below.  
If this rule holds, alert will be triggered as ana action. Hostile packet may come 
from any IP address and any source port. Destination IP block is defined as 10.0.0.0/24, 
C class network and destination port is specified as 9999. 
Rule options define that application payload content contains a specific byte string. 
Last part defines informational message on hostile activity. Snort can also be used to 
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detect weird activities in addition to detecting security and usage policy violations on 
networks.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2. A simple Snort rule 
 
2.6.1.2. Snort Rule Chain 
 
Network Intrusion Detection mode of Snort, tries to detect intrusions on a rule-
matching basis. Rules are stored and used as a two dimensional linked lists, which 
connect chain headers and chain options. Common attributes of a set of rules are 
represented as chain headers, aiming to increase speed of rule-matching operations. 
Uncommon attributes, such as different flags on packets or payloads are linked and the 
list of options are connected to chain header. Snort’s detection engine checks rules for 
matching on chain headers and options (Roesch 1999). Rule chain mechanism is shown 
in Fig.2.3. 
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Fig.2.3.Snort’s rule chain mechanism  
                                                     (Redrawn, Original Source: Roesch 1999) 
 
Snort may produce alerts, logs and warnings when a rule on a chain is matched. 
Rules and counter-measures on these cases may be altered by maintainers.  
 
2.6.1.3. Preprocessors and Output Plug-ins of Snort 
 
 Snort can be extended by different plug-ins, thanks to its preprocessor and 
output plug-in enabling architecture. Special operations such as embedding different 
algorithms or additional event correlation may be added. Default snort package comes 
with different preprocessors such as port scan detection, http protocol inspector, 
fragmentation and flow control. Port scan preprocessor control incoming packets for 
port scanning probes and creates alerts. Another preprocessor of Snort is SPADE, which 
is to be evaluated in this study. Output plug-ins have different purposes such as 
reporting or additional post processing over data. 
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2.6.2. Estimates on Detection Rates of Snort 
 
Since Snort is a rule-based system (NIDS mode is considered and compared on 
this context), its detection rate and success rate depends on its rules coverage. A good 
rule will help getting a high detection rate, with low false alarm rate. On the other hand, 
a badly written rule will sign a higher rate of legitimate traffic as hostile. Snort will help 
its users proportional to its master’s ability to tune itself for more effective usage. By 
the way, estimates on the detection rate and effectiveness of whole system will be a 
rough one. Snort has different rule sources available, not limited to contributors from its 
user community, and Snort development team. It is also possible to subscribe for 
commercial rule services from different vendors.  
In this study IDEVAL 99 DataSet is used for estimating this rate, in terms of successful 
detections and false alarm rate. Results and discussion may be found on Section 6.2 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 INTRUSION DETECTION ALGORITHM 
IMPLEMENTATIONS 
 
 
3.1. Overview 
 
Intrusion detection aims to identify hostile activity on computer systems. Since 
all attacks on systems can not be modeled and identified, a range of attacks can not be 
detected by signature detection techniques. However it is possible to identify hostile 
activity by anomalies they create on systems or traces they leave. Detecting anomalies 
for detecting intrusion activities be a useful method for intrusion detection. Anomaly 
detection tries to identify events which are rare or previously unseen and unexpected 
events in the environment. This may be some features of packets in network traffic, 
clothes or people passing by some point. There is a rare or previously unseen event such 
as a man with a Mexican hat on an elephant passing by street, or a group of dancers 
dancing or a packet with some features which has not been seen before. When these 
events are to be modeled, need for information about the event and similar events arise. 
There is a need to define norm and a training sequence for defining what is rare. In 
addition to defining norm and training sequences, there is another question about nature 
of events in interest. Events, which may describe people passing, can be independent, or 
dependent, a group of dancers in a carnival city passing by avenue. Predicting an 
event’s probability has been an interest for people for a long time, especially modeling 
purposes. There are models developed for one time predictions, such as Laplace and 
Good-Turing (WEB_10 2006) methods. (Mahoney 2003) has introduced a time based 
modeling method and used this time based method for detecting novel events and 
eventually for detecting anomalies in network traffic derived from Laplace’s model. 
This model and mathematical background is summarized in next section. 
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3.2. Modeling Novel Events 
 
In our everyday life we try to predict events in the future, next day’s weather, 
color of next car which will pass along the street etc. We usually depend on our 
observations and ignore effects of unseen events. However unseen events also have 
their probabilities to happen. It is harder to accurately estimate unseen events’ 
probabilities, or particularly novel values. It may be thought it is a good method to use 
experience from observations. However, observations will ignore events which may 
happen but have zero frequency in sampling or training period. Estimating probabilities 
for previously unseen events is called zero-frequency problem. Another unknown on 
this problem is size of alphabet or total set of possible events. 
For estimating these probabilities, the method, known as Good-Turing has been 
developed by Jeffrey Good and Alan Turing. (WEB_11 2006) provides more 
information on historical perspective of the method. Good-Turing estimation has been 
extensively used in empirical linguistics area. On the other hand, this estimation method 
needs observations to be independent (Mahoney 2003). As stated before, network 
activity does not consist of independent events; instead the events have long range 
dependencies in time. The process may be described as self-similar or fractal, but not 
Poisson. Good-Turing estimation may not be the correct estimation method for 
assigning probabilities from now on, so a different method for estimating probabilities 
for novel events should be used. In addition, this method should not require independent 
events.  
PPM (Prediction by Partial Match) (Cleary and Witten 1984) compression 
algorithm, which is an adaptive text compression algorithm, needs estimating 
probabilities for symbols to be predicted. In addition overall performance of 
compression is closely related to assigned probabilities for values not seen before.  
PPMC – PPM Method C (Witten and Bell 1991) has been introduced and shown to be 
experimentally better than other methods on estimating probabilities. For method C this 
probability is defined as: 
 
Pr (next event will be novel) = r / (n + r) 
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where r is the number of distinct types observed so far and n is the total number of  
observations. As n increases, this formula may converge to r/n.  
(Mahoney and Chan 2001) provides one more coefficient for time based 
anomaly modeling, the effect of time and dependence of values seen before. An 
observation in which some values are consequently repeated, there is a probability of 
dependence between observations. If this is the case, calculating next event’s 
probability will need information about previous observations. For anomaly based time 
modeling, let time amount of t has passed. Then average rate of seeing an anomaly 
becomes t. After amount of time t passes it is possible to see another novel event. So, 
P(novel) can be assumed as 1/t. 
(Mahoney and Chan 2001) constructs anomaly score mechanism as 1/P(novel) = 
tn/r applying previous formula since is constructed as P(novel) = (1/t)(r/n), where n 
(total number of observations) and r (number of types seen) are counted during the 
training period, and where t is the time in seconds since the last anomaly.  
By an anomaly may occur during either training or testing, with the difference 
that if a novel value is observed in training it is added to the set of allowed values, but if 
it occurs during testing it is not. Note that in our model, P(novel) = (r/n)(1/t), which 
accounts for both the baseline rate of novel events, r/n, and a time-based model for 
events occurring outside the set of allowed values, 1/t. tn/r anomaly score is computed 
for each attribute on observed instance. Anomaly score of all features are added as all 
features are as of to be independent of each other. This anomaly scoring method will 
tend to produce higher anomaly scores as anomalous events are observed less 
frequently. 
 
3.3. Packet Header Anomaly Detection 
 
Packet Header Anomaly Detection (PHAD) algorithm is based on the anomaly 
score calculation method described above. PHAD models 33 header fields as attributes, 
found in Data Link (Ethernet), Network (Internet Protocol) and Transport Layer (TCP, 
UDP and ICMP) (Mahoney and Chan 2001). Fields for Ethernet, IP, TCP, UDP and 
ICMP Headers are shown in A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4 and A.5 in Appendix A. 
All fields on the TCP/IP stack headers are not equal in size, longer fields such as 
MAC Address field in Ethernet frame has been split into two three byte long fields. One 
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byte fields such as SYN and ACK are grouped into one byte field. The list below is the 
list of fields modeled on PHAD grouped by layer and protocol (Mahoney 2003): 
• Ethernet header (found in all packets): packet size, source address (high and 
low 3 bytes), destination address (high and low 3 bytes), and protocol (usually 
IPv4). 
• IP header: header length, TOS, packet size, IP fragment ID, IP flags and pointer 
(as a 2 byte attribute), TTL, protocol, checksum (computed), and source and 
destination addresses. 
• TCP header: source and destination ports, sequence and acknowledgment 
numbers, header length, flags, window size, checksum (computed), urgent 
pointer, and options (4 bytes if present). 
• UDP header: source and destination ports, checksum (computed), and length. 
• ICMP header: type, code, and checksum (computed). 
 
PHAD stores values in a clustered approach. If a novel value for a field arrives 
during training phase, this value is merged into cluster it. If no group contains the novel 
value, it is merged into the cluster which the novel value is closer to.  
 
3.4. Application Layer Anomaly Detector 
 
Application Layer Anomaly Detector is an anomaly detection algorithm 
developed by (Mahoney and Chan 2002a). This algorithm differs from PHAD in three 
points. First difference from PHAD is that ALAD algorithm uses application payload 
for detecting anomalies, where PHAD observed fields of lower layer protocols. ALAD 
algorithm calculates anomalies using features found in incoming TCP server 
connections. Instead of using all incoming packets coming to monitored server port, 
features only found in three packets are used. These are first, next to last and last packet 
in communication. Their difference is that only text based application protocols are 
included (e.g. HTTP, SMTP, etc.), binary protocols such as (e.g. DNS, RPC, etc.) are 
excluded. Model covers at most 1000 bytes of application payload, arguments and 
keywords after 1000th byte will not be included. ALAD can use conditional probability 
models applied on the features, such as P (source IP | destination IP) instead of using 
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only single probabilities, such as P (source IP). Features used to calculate conditional 
probabilities may be arbitrarily selected.  
 
ALAD uses six features on reassembled TCP streams. These are: 
• Source IP address, which is also the client 
• Destination IP address, which is also the server  
• Destination port number of the server application, which is related to service 
protocol. 
• TCP Flags of first and last two packets, e.g. SYN, SYN/ACK or FIN/ACK. 
Flags are used for modeling state of TCP connection. 
• Application keywords, the first word on a command line, such as a GET, POST 
or  
HEAD in a HTTP request 
• Application arguments, the rest of request command delimited by a line feed, 
such as  
“/somefile.html HTTP/1.1”, “Host: www.iyte.edu.tr” or “User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0” 
in a HTTP request.  
Selecting features to be used in calculating conditional probability calculations has a 
large space of probable combinations of features. For example, in presence of 5 
features, there exist 32 combinations (25 = 32) of features for antecedent event which 
contains no feature choice to all features choice. For consequent event, almost the same 
combination space applies, but alternatives which include chosen features for 
antecedent event are eliminated. Combination space grows exponentially as more usable 
features are considered for detection. It is obvious that all combinations of selected 
attributes and probabilities will show different detection rates. Selecting right 
combinations of probabilities will certainly help getting good detection rates and lower 
false alarm rates. 
ALAD uses the same time based modeling model with PHAD. The same anomaly 
score detection formula, anomaly score = tn/r, applies for ALAD. Scoring is made on 
observations in testing phase, using information obtained in training phase. In 
conditional model, separate t, n and r values are maintained for each distinct value of 
antecedent event, where n holds total number of observations that consequent event also 
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happened, t is the time past since last anomaly, r is number of distinct values for the 
consequent event.  
 
3.5. Learning Rules for Anomaly Detection 
 
Learning Rules for Anomaly Detection (LERAD) (Mahoney and Chan 2003a) is an 
anomaly detection algorithm which generates rules from arbitrary combinations of 
nominal attributes (Attributes are denoted with Ai and values for the attributes are 
denoted with vi). This algorithm does not need selecting rules; instead it generates and 
selects itself. It uses a rule mechanism composed of a set of constraints on attributes and 
defines set of allowed values for another attribute under these constraints (Mahoney 
2003). Rules have the form: 
  A1 = v1 and A2 = v2 and … Ak = vk => Ak+1 ∈ Vk = {set of allowed values} 
Chosen rules are the ones which produce high values of n and low values of r, where 
n stands for number of constraints in antecedent events and r stands for number of 
elements for the set of allowed values for Ak+1. Rules are generated by observing 
instances in training session. Choosing the rule step has generation and elimination 
steps. This step defines normal behavior and rule set for normal. In testing phase 
anomalies for deviations from normal are to be found by checking instances for fitting 
these rules. If a rule is violated, then an anomaly score is calculated using the same 
formula as of PHAD and ALAD; anomaly score = tn/r. Total anomaly score is 
summation of anomaly scores for each violated rule. However there are separate n, r and 
t values for each rule. Time variable t is calculated from the last anomaly either in 
training or testing. Instances which do not violate a rule take 0 as anomaly score. 
LERAD uses attributes similar to ALAD, but excludes binary protocols and makes 
use of keywords and certain information found in lower layer protocol headers. 
 
3.5.1. Rule Set Generation 
 
LERAD reviews training data and creates candidate rules using a randomized 
algorithm and tests them with more training data. It selects random pairs of instances 
from set of training instances. Using the values for attributes in chosen instances it tries 
to generate rules which produce n/r rate with 2/1. An attribute common in the training 
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pair becomes consequent event. Consequent attribute can take all or some of other 
attributes as antecedent. If more than one attribute is common, more rules can be 
generated. The more attributes exist; the more rules can be generated using same pair of 
data. This leads to a large set of rules which includes redundant and weaker rules. 
 
3.5.2. Rule Elimination 
 
Generated rule set may contain rules which may be superseded by other rules, in 
terms of their capability to cover training instances. These rules actually don’t add extra 
capability for prediction to current rule set, thus they may be considered to be 
redundant. This leads to general rules with fewer numbers, instead of specific rules in 
vast numbers. There is another set of rules which are not redundant but perform poorly 
on detections. The rules which generate false alarms towards to the end of full training 
set are considered to perform poorly. This is due to nature of the attributes. Some 
attributes will have vast amounts of values increasing over time with a significant rate 
(e.g. names of ships visiting an international port), whereas some attributes will 
converge to a value set and will almost the same values over some time (e.g. names of 
ships coming to a port near a lake). Performance of rules is benchmarked by checking 
alarms they create at some limited time at the end of training phase. Since training phase 
doesn’t contain traffic with attacks, bad rules will tend to produce more anomalies (i.e. 
false alarms in this context). Poor rules are removed before testing phase. Fig. 3.6 shows 
a graphical demonstration of good and poor rules growth rates and quality. 
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Fig. 3.1.Growth rate for rules in terms of performance  
                                      (Source: Mahoney and Chan 2003a) 
 
3.6. Network Traffic Anomaly Detector 
 
Network Traffic Anomaly Detector (NETAD) (Mahoney and Chan 2003b) is an 
anomaly detection algorithm, which detects anomalies in non-novel events in addition 
to detection of novel events. Some of non-novel events may also be considered 
anomalous if they occur sufficiently rare and not recently in this continuous modeling 
algorithm. This algorithm is more suitable for real world online systems because of its 
ability to adapt into changing nature of traffic in addition to its capability to accept 
mixed traffic (i.e. traffic which contains both attacks and attack-free traffic) in learning 
phase.  
NETAD, similar to PHAD, works packet base, but uses only start of inbound client 
session traffic, unlike PHAD. This makes a small percentage of overall network traffic; 
ignoring rest of the traffic is some sort of trade-off for detecting anomalies in outbound 
responses. NETAD filters certain types of traffic since it is not used. These types of 
traffic are (Mahoney 2003): 
 
• All non-IP packets (e.g. ARP, IPX etc.), since alarms are identified with their IP 
addresses 
• All outgoing packet traffic. 
• All TCP streams that begins with SYN-ACK. 
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• UDP packets to port number higher than 1023 (response to a local client) 
• TCP packets with sequence numbers more than 100 past the initial sequence 
number (i.e. after the first 100 bytes of incoming client data). 
• Packets addressed to any address/port/protocol combination (TCP, UDP, or 
ICMP) after the first 16 packets in 60 seconds (to limit bursts of UDP or ICMP 
traffic). 
NETAD only needs first 100 bytes of the inbound IP traffic and uses first 48 byte 
out of 100. First 48 bytes contain IP and TCP Headers in addition to first 8 bytes of 
application payload. In presence of non-empty IP and TCP option fields, payload 
contents are not covered either. However NETAD considers each byte is an attribute, 
any shift in fields or values are simply out of interest. 
NETAD model covers 9 types of packets. These nine types of traffic lead to 432 
rules (Mahoney and Chan 2003c) in the same form of LERAD’s rules. Nine models 
represent commonly exploited protocols in IDEVAL data set. The following rules are 
selected for NETAD, according to experimental results: 
1. All IP packets (no antecedent). 
2. All TCP packets (if protocol = TCP (6)) 
3. TCP SYN (if TCP and flags = SYN (2)) 
4. TCP data (if TCP and flags = ACK (16)) 
5. TCP data for ports 0-255 (if TCP and ACK and DP1 (dest. port high byte) = 
0) 
6. telnet (if TCP and ACK and DP1 = 0 and DP0 = 21) 
7. FTP (if TCP and ACK and DP1 = 0 and DP0 = 23) 
8. SMTP (if TCP and ACK and DP1 = 0 and DP0 = 25) 
9. HTTP (if TCP and ACK and DP1 = 0 and DP0 = 80) 
Anomaly score is calculated by summing anomaly scores of a packet for each rule. 
Anomaly score of a packet for a rule may be calculated one of the methods explained 
below: 
Novel values only: anomaly score = tn/r. n is number of training packets satisfying 
the prior event, r is number of values seen in training for that field. t is the time 
passed since last anomaly either in training or in testing. 
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Validation weighed novel values: anomaly score = tna/r where na denotes number 
of packets satisfying the antecedent from the last training anomaly to end. This gives 
more weight for “better” rules than “good” rules. 
 
Fast Uniformity Detection: Score = tna(1 – r/256)/r. This method helps degrade 
effect of  rules for fields, in which most of possible values (out of [0,255] period ) 
are already observed during training stage. 
 
Non-novel values: Score = tin/(ni + 1), where ti is the time (packet count, training or 
test) 
since the value i was last seen, and ni is the number of times i was seen in training. It 
reduces to tin for novel events and ti / fi (with a Laplace approximation of fi = ni/n 
where n stands for overall packet count) for non-novel events. 
 
Weighed model: Score = tin/(n1 + r/W), where W = 256 is an experimentally 
determined 
weight emphasizing novel events. It reduces to Wtin/r for novel events and 
approximately 
ti/fi for non-novel events. 
 
NETAD combined model: Score = tna(1 – r/256)/r + tin/(n1 + r/W). Combined 
model is sum of weight model and fast uniformity detection models (Mahoney 
2003). 
 
3.7. Statistical Packet Anomaly Detection Engine 
 
Statistical Packet Anomaly Detection Engine (SPADE) (Hoagland 2000) is pre-
processor plug-in developed for Snort. It had been actively developed by Silicon 
Defense, however due to financial problems, development ended in 2003. Since its 
source code was copyrighted with a free software license, source code has been open. 
Source code maintenance and distribution is now performed under Bleeding Edge Snort 
community (WEB_12 2006) sponsorship.  
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SPADE looks for anomalies in traffic by its task-specific detectors. SPADE can not 
actually determine a packet is hostile or friendly, but can say how unusual or how 
anomalous a packet is. SPADE, similar to PHAD, only monitors network and transport 
layer fields.  SPADE has 5 different detector modes: 
 
• Closed Destination Port (closed-dport): closed-dport detector watches TCP and 
UDP traffic for use of closed or rarely used destination ports on home (local) 
network. This detector may be useful for detecting probing attempts. Closed-dport 
detector is the oldest detector of SPADE. Waiting period can be defined for this 
detector type, which helps removing passive FTP issues. Alerts are fired if a closed 
destination port replies as RST packet or ICMP unreachable response message. 
Third case covers anomalous but open destination ports which are accessed rarely. 
SPADE has four different probability modes (probmode option) for this detector 
type: 
1. Mode 0: a Bayesian network approximation of P (sip, sport, dip, dport) 
2. Mode 1:  P (source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port) 
3. Mode 2:  P (source IP, destination IP, destination port) 
4. Mode 3:  P (destination IP, destination port) (this is the default choice) 
 
• Dead Destination (dead-dest): dead-dest detector watches traffic for use of IP 
addresses that are not used actually. Some worms use an exhaustive try-fail 
technique to spread in local and remote networks. This detector may help detecting 
these activities. 
 
• Odd Destination Port (odd-dport): This detector watches traffic for port usage 
which differs from existing normal usage patterns. This detector may help 
discovering recently installed covert channels, special backdoors on possibly 
compromised machines. 
 
• Odd Port Destination (odd-port-dest): This detector reports connections 
performed by clients on servers using unusual port numbers. This may help 
discovering compromised hosts on home network. 
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• Odd Type Code (odd-typecode): odd-typecode detector reports unusual ICMP 
traffic (in terms of ICMP type and code values) observed on network. 
 
SPADE defines its normal usage by maintaining probability tables for monitored 
events. Records are weighted according to their occurrence time; newer events have 
more weight and older events have less weight on calculations. According to its 
probability tables all packets received by SPADE get an anomaly score.  
There are two anomaly score calculation methods used in SPADE (Biles 2006). 
These are: 
• Raw Anomaly Score: This score is calculated quite straightforward using 
formula 
 
A(X) = – log 2 (P(X)) 
 
Raw anomaly score can be confusing to remember and benchmark with similar 
scores. To overcome this confusion, relative anomaly scoring method is introduced. 
 
• Relative Anomaly Score: Relative Anomaly Score tries to remove confusion 
caused by raw anomaly score. Relative AS is calculated simply by dividing raw 
anomaly score by highest possible raw anomaly score. This method will always 
produce anomaly values between 0 and 1, so it is easier to comment on rarity of 
the event. 
 
3.8. Results of Previous Studies 
 
Five anomaly detection algorithms, namely PHAD, ALAD, LERAD, NETAD and 
SPADE, are introduced in this chapter. These five algorithms have been trained and 
tested using IDEVAL data set and produced different results. Table 3.1 shows 
comparative results of detection performance of each algorithm tested on IDEVAL data 
set. Data is based on (Mahoney and Chan 2002b) and (Mahoney and Chan 2003c).  
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Table 3.1.Comparison of Detections of Selected  
                                                Algorithms on IDEVAL Data 
 
Algorithm/System Number of Detections 
( at 100 FA) 
PHAD 54 
PHAD + ALAD 60 
LERAD (avg.) 114 
PHAD + ALAD + LERAD 85 
NETAD 132 
 
During development stage of this study, it has become obvious that there exist 
simulation artifacts in IDEVAL data, which could result misleading results. For 
example TTL field is considered an artifact since it doesn’t change over time and has 
almost the same values in all simulation. It is far from reflecting real-world case. Even 
though background of IDEVAL data seems realistic generally, there are problems to be 
uncovered and probably there is more to uncover. Analysis of 1999 Evaluation data set 
has been made and revealed other artifacts found in simulation (Mahoney and Chan 
2003b). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA COLLECTION OPERATION 
 
 
In Chapter 3, five algorithm implementations and their working principles are 
introduced. These implementations were tested on IDEVAL 99 Data Set and local data 
collected from a server from researchers’ university. To test these algorithms with a 
different data, another data set is created with efforts of Izmir Institute of Technology 
(IZTECH) Computer Application and Research Center (CARC). This chapter 
introduces and describes some fundamental properties of local data set, provides 
comparison with other datasets.  
 
4.1. Overview 
 
There are about 2000 computers working in a weekday in IZTECH campus, 
serving as clients and servers. Client computers are used for accessing the Internet and 
different servers in campus network. Users access Internet via a router which connects 
whole campus network to Internet Service Provider (ISP). There are two IP address 
blocks used in campus network, one real, one virtual. Real IP address block is generally 
used for servers on campus allowing to be accessed from the Internet. Virtual IP address 
block, which contains addresses available for private uses of enterprises, are used to 
connect clients to the Internet. These computers are not accessible from outside of the 
campus. These clients connect to the Internet via a gateway. Table 4.1 shows these 
address blocks and their properties 
 
Table 4.1.Available IP address blocks in IZTECH campus 
 
Network Real/Virtual Assignment Usage 
193.140.248.0/22 Real Assigned by ISP Servers and Clients 
10.10.0.0/16 Virtual Free for private uses Clients 
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4.2. Data Collection Environment and Properties 
 
 Data collection operation is performed by a dedicated computer installed by 
IZTECH-CARC personnel, between 04.06.2006 and 04.17.2006 for sampling from 
servers for data inspection and intrusion detection research purposes. Data consists of 
sniffed network traffic of four servers located in campus, each of which has different 
purposes and operating systems. List of servers and their operating systems are shown 
in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2.List of servers, whose traffic has been collected. 
 
Server Name Goal Operating System 
bbsserver - Solaris  
likya - Linux  
gulbahce - Linux  
ftp file transfer Windows NT Server  
 
The servers and the sniffer computer are connected to the same network switch. 
All servers are connected with a 10/100 Mbit Ethernet card. All traffic of the servers 
was cloned into sniffer’s port using “port mirroring” feature of network switch. 
Simplified architecture of data collection operation and campus network is shown in 
Fig. 4.1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1.Simplified architecture of campus network and data collection operation 
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Traffic collection starts in 04.06. 2006 at 14:32:14  and ends in 04.17.2006  at 
17:14:16. It spanned in 12 days, but collected traffic data is almost 11 days long, takes 
space about 39 GB. Whole data is not is saved as a single file, instead divided into 
numerous parts with different sizes. These files were reorganized to reflect daily traffic, 
using a patched version of tcpslice program. Tcpslice is a program is used to perform 
cut and paste operations on fragments of network traffic data files. Detailed information 
about these such as size and numbers is given in Appendix B. Main findings and certain 
properties of dataset are described in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DEMONSTRATION OF ALGORITHM 
IMPLEMENTATIONS 
 
 
PHAD, ALAD, LERAD (both variants), NETAD and SPADE algorithms are to 
be tested using IDEVAL and data collected from IZTECH campus. PHAD, ALAD, 
LERAD and NETAD are standalone applications, SPADE is a preprocessor plug-in 
developed for integration with Snort. This chapter describes demonstration process of 
these implementations. 
 
5.1. Testing Environment and Tools 
 
5.1.1. Testing Environment 
 
Hardware: Tests were made on a PC with Pentium IV 2.9 GHz (with Hyper Threading 
support) processor and 1GB of RAM.  
Operating System: Fedora Core 4 with kernel version 2.6.11-1.1369_FC4.  
 
5.1.2. Testing Tools 
 
Following software packages were used for evaluation:  
• tcpdump tool version 3.9.4 
• Libpcap packet capture library with version 0.9.4 for individual operations 
• Snort lightweight IDS version 2.4.2 with SPADE - Integrated tarball version 
• Ethereal version 0.99.0 with libpcap version 0.8.3. This older version of libpcap 
did not have any version conflicts with latest version 
• Source codes for PHAD, ALAD, LERAD, NETAD, EVAL and other 
supplemental material provided by (WEB_14 2006 ) 
• gcc compiler v.4.0.0 20050519 (Red Hat 4.0.0-8) 
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5.1.3. Modifications on Configurations and Programs 
 
5.1.3.1. Configuration of Snort and SPADE 
 
Registered User Release of Snort rules available as of May 25 2006 are used. 
Default configuration is modified to include more rules in numbers, with allowing 
minimum rules about non-hostile activities, such as online gaming or IRC chat. Default 
running configurations of preprocessors are not changed except addition of SPADE 
configuration lines. 030125.1 version of SPADE is used.  
 Snort’s and SPADE’s “home network” settings were modified to reflect IP 
address blocks of evaluation networks. No extra rules have been written to adapt 
specific properties of networks. No special tuning operation was performed on Snort 
except changes explained below. Following rule sets were excluded on both operations: 
• chat: rules for detecting IRC and instant messaging (IM) activity such as MSN 
• multimedia: rules for detecting various multimedia material transfer 
• p2p: rules for detecting peer to peer networking activities such as file sharing 
• experimental: experimental rules, which was already empty in evaluation 
• porn: rules for checking sexually explicit material on content 
 
In IDEVAL scenario, servers are remotely monitored by remote Air Force 
computers. Two SNMP rules and one other rule caused more than 40000 alerts in a 
single attack-free day and hence they were disabled. The disabled rules are as follows: 
• “Web bug 1x1 gif attempt” alert (web bug is a 1x1 gif file used for tracking page 
visitors’ trends (WEB_15 2006)) 
• “SNMP public access udp” alert (Simple Network Management protocol is 
designed for remote monitoring and management, which generally uses UDP as 
transport protocol).  
• “SNMP request udp” alert (a SNMP request is made )  
 
SPADE had one detector open with following configuration: 
• Detector type: closed-dport 
• TCP Flags: synonly ( only SYN flag is set ) 
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• To: home (packets are destined to home network clients) 
• Wait: 3 (Determines time out period for a host to reply an incoming SYN packet 
) 
• Protocol: TCP 
• Probability Mode: 3 (the probability model: P (dest. IP, dest. port), explained in 
section 3.6 )  
All alerts (saved into a text file named “alert”), logs (saved into a binary file named 
Snort.log.x where is a positive integer, indicating startup time in Unix time format) and 
SPADE state files (spade.rcv) are logged into /var/log/snort directory. 
 
5.1.3.2. Modifications on Algorithm Implementations 
 
 Original source code of PHAD failed to process IZTECH dataset, because of 
byte order difference problem (WEB_16 2006). IDEVAL data was collected and saved 
on big-endian machines (Haines et al. 2001). Original source code could only process 
big-endian data. Since IZTECH dataset was collected on a PC (with 80x86 
architecture), it is saved as little-endian. Modifications were made to original source 
code and tests were performed to check both accuracy of modified version and 
consistency with original program. Modified versions of the source code are presented 
in a CD provided with this study. Contents of the CD are in Appendix C. 
 
5.2. Training Systems 
 
 Snort did not need any training, because of being a signature based system. 
SPADE has no prior training period, for first run. In every run SPADE records 
observations for monitored activities, after 50000 updates. At the end of each running 
session, SPADE records its current state, which holds statistical information. SPADE 
uses incoming packets provided by Snort and needs no extra preprocessing for both 
training and test periods. At each start of Snort, it searches for state file. Snort logs and 
alert files were relocated for further processing in order to store separate alert files for 
different days. SPADE state files were not relocated for consequent evaluations for 
members of the same dataset. 
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 PHAD and other algorithms were trained using IDEVAL data set’s attack free 
traffic provided for systems training. In fact, real time traffic can contain novel attacks. 
For algorithms which can accept mixed traffic, all IDEVAL traffic is used.  
 PHAD, ALAD, LERAD and NETAD are standalone applications which run 
using given parameters from command line. PHAD takes two primary inputs; training 
time in seconds, list of data files. Input files are ordered chronologically. Training phase 
starts from the instance of earlist packet in first data file and spans as long as given 
training time parameter. Each packet after training period ends is used as test data. 
 ALAD, LERAD and NETAD have a two pass approach. First pass covers 
preparation of data for processing, such traffic filtering, keyword or feature extraction 
from data files, etc. There are three supplemental programs used for data preparation. 
These are 
• te: traffic extraction utility, extracts TCP streams from tcpdump files. 
• a2l.pl: a perl script which converts output of te to LERAD compatible format 
• tf: traffic filtering program 
 ALAD uses interim files provided by te as data. It takes two parameters, one for 
training data file and other for test data file, both of which are interim files. Output is in 
sim format. 
 LERAD uses data files similar to ALAD. ALAD compatible files are converted 
for use of LERAD using a2l.pl. Outputs are text files. LERAD uses three parameters; 
first two is similar to ALAD, these are training and testing files. Third parameter is 
random number seed - required for LERAD's randomized algorithm. Another variant of 
LERAD uses interim data files generated using tf.  
 NETAD also uses data files generated by tf. Since training period is hardcoded 
in original version, it does not use external parameters other than training and test file 
names. 
 
5.3. Testing Systems 
 
Detection performance operations on IDEVAL were performed by EVAL 
program, which is compatible with original evaluation detection criteria. For 
demonstration on real data, Snort is used for benchmarking since there is not an 
available evaluation program for analyzing live data similar to EVAL. A portion of 
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IDEVAL training data is used for training systems for algorithms which require attack-
free data. In addition, a portion of real data is used for testing after training.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
6.1. Findings on IZTECH Dataset 
 
 There are significant differences in simulated traffic of IDEVAL data set and a 
real traffic data. Some of simple and significant differences between IDEVAL, IZTECH 
and FIT data sets are described in the following sections. Since FIT data is not publicly 
available, an available source of statistical information for this dataset is (Mahoney and 
Chan 2003c). This data source is served as main tool for making comparisons. Ethereal 
software package tools (tethereal and capinfos) and Snort was used to extract statistical 
information from datasets. Graphics are generated using Microsoft Excel. 
 
6.1.1. Description of Collected Data 
 
6.1.1.1. General Properties 
 
Data set contains about 74 million packets and takes 39 GB of disk space. Daily 
distribution of collected packets and size of traffic data is shown on Fig. 6.1. 
Collected data is almost continuous, except a 50 min. gap in Apr 7 2006. Average 
bandwidth usage has been 339 Kbits/sec for overall traffic. Data rates of individual 
samples vary between 40 KBits/sec and 20 Mbits/sec. Average bandwidth usage for 
days are shown in Fig. 6.2. Average packet size of samples varies between 324 and 691. 
Daily averages for packet size is shown in Fig. 6.3. Most common protocols on daily 
traffic are shown in Fig 6.4 and 6.5.  
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Fig. 6.1. Daily distribution of data and packets 
 
 
 
Fig.6.2 Daily data rates in data set 
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Fig.6.3.Average packet size graph for data set 
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Fig.6.4.Daily distribution of HTTP traffic 
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Fig.6.5.Daily distribution of other three frequently used protocols 
 
6.1.1.2. Intrusion Activity 
 
At first glance, collected traffic may seem to be relatively clean. However after 
careful examination, it has become clear that attack patterns exist and distributed among 
all data. Only one of 43 data file was found to be clean, however this may be considered 
trivial, since file contains about 497 packets recorded in 10 seconds and takes only 90 
KB in disc. 
Evidences of probing attacks can be found in almost every data sample. Most 
probes were checking for open SQL Server ports (port no: 1433). Most frequently 
scanned ports are given in Table 4.3 with their possible attacker and application.  
 
Table 6.1. Most frequently scanned ports and count of instances 
 
Port Application (Legitimate or Malicious) and Possible Reason Probe Count 
1433 Microsoft SQL Server 2230 
445 Microsoft-ds - Server Message Block (SMB) and worms 2181 
139 Netbios Session Service and Trojans 2132 
80 WWW and various Trojans 2069 
1080 SOCKS Proxy Server, trojans,  worms or spammers 1133 
15118 dipnet trojan backdoor, worms 746 
8080 www alternative port, trojans and backdoors 663 
5900 Real Virtual Network Computing (VNC) 659 
3372 Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator (DTC) 455 
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22 Secure Shell (ssh) and Trojans 406 
1026 Windows Remote Procedure Call (RPC), worms Unknown 
1027 ICQ Instant messenger Unknown 
 
Two ports have experienced unknown number of probes. This is due to 
uncertainties in probing activities and imprecise nature of port-scan preprocessor of 
Snort. Probe counts are obtained after processing of Snort alert files. The port-scan and 
Spade preprocessor alerts have alerted for different activities, sometimes overlapping.  
There are traces of spammer activity in traffic, looking for badly configured mail 
servers for relaying mail messages or directly sending messages to server. Probing for 
sending spam may be considered as commercial activity employing illegal methods.  
There are two types of probes: probes which focus on certain port on a range of 
computers and probes focus on open ports of a specific computer. In addition there are 
other probes, such as ping probes for various IP address ranges, usually used for 
checking whether a specific computer is connected. These ping and port probes may be 
used together to cooperate by attackers. 
There is an attack wave between 04.13.2006 to end of data collection directed to 
open port 3306 on one of servers. This port is used by MySQL Database Management 
System. Remote attacker has tried to guess root password of the server. Total number of 
detected trials in that period is 663451. There is not an evidence of success of attacker, 
since no data exists about successful login and probing operation was underway at the 
time when data collection ended. It should have ended before end of collected data. Port 
3306 has also been probed in port scans, but not as much as other ports. In addition 
there are other password trials in other days, but numbers of consecutive trials are much 
lower. 
 
6.1.2. Comparison with IDEVAL Dataset 
 
IDEVAL dataset is produced after a simulation effort, made in 1999, according 
to statistical information collected in 1998 from various US Air Force bases. Content of 
simulated traffic differed from our traffic in many ways, such as data and packet rates, 
protocols etc. 
IDEVAL traffic data has a smaller data rate and packet size, producing a smaller 
data set. Generated traffic, which covers only weekdays of 5 weeks, contains about 52M 
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packets and takes about 10.8 GB of space. Daily distribution of traffic in IDEVAL is 
shown in Fig. 6.6.  
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Fig.6.6.Daily traffic distribution in IDEVAL 
 
IDEVAL traffic is different from our dataset in many ways: 
Synthetic Traffic: IDEVAL traffic is created in laboratory environment using 
scripts and other sorts of programs. Properties of the traffic which is to be synthesized is 
based on statistical information that came from military based in different locations. Our 
traffic is collected from a campus network and is generated by users in campus, people 
and software accessing the servers. These large communities with different things in 
mind have helped to create a traffic record with an unrepeatable and surprising nature.  
Age and Span: IDEVAL data sets have been built according to statistical data 
which belongs to 1997 (Haines et al. 2001), reflecting trends in that time. It spans about 
6 weeks (Extra days of Week 3 is actually fourth week of March) and is recorded into 
daily partitions. Weekend days are excluded in simulation. However our recorded traffic 
spans 12 days, including weekends and almost continuous. 
Different trends: IDEVAL traffic is created based on different trends and usage 
policies. By time some of these policies or trends change. For example using finger to 
check whether a user exists in a mail server before sending a mail is a trend in IDEVAL 
traffic. However finger action has long been discouraged from practical usage 
(WEB_13 2006). Visited sites and tools may change place to place and people to 
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people. This is another difference. In IDEVAL traffic there is no crawler activity, 
however these agents have become most common visitors of websites. 
Daily Data Size and Packet Counts: Daily data size of IDEVAL is very 
different from our traffic. It has smaller data size, lower number of packets and thus a 
lower bandwidth usage. IDEVAL case may be considered as unrealistic for today’s 
Internet. As it is obvious in Fig. 4.3 and 4.7, highest traffic load in IDEVAL is about 
25% of lowest traffic load in our dataset. However this information should not be 
considered decisive; since more real time data may help denying this proposition. 
Protocol Distribution and Variety: There are similar protocols used in 
simulation and in real world, these are ARP, IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, SMTP, POP3, 
FTP,FTP-DATA, IMAP, nbname, nbdgram protocols. No IMAP traffic was captured in 
campus but had different other protocols running such as Spanning Tree Protocol (STP), 
nbss, Microsoft-ds and non-IP based protocols. There is limited use of telnet and ssh in 
traffic. 
Traffic Scope: IDEVAL network traffic has been collected by two sniffers, 
labeled as inside and outside, recording all traffic passing by. For inside traffic, it covers 
communication between hosts, too. Our collection has a limited scope of traffic that is 
about a group of servers, connected to same switch. Our approach excludes clients’ 
activities in general except their communication with sniffed servers. 
Traffic Regularity: 5 weeks of synthetic data has about 40 million packets but 
none of these contain bad checksums, either IP or TCP. Our samples, which covered 
more than half of overall traffic, has bad IP and TCP checksums in different numbers, 
but with quite low percentage in overall data. Bad checksum probability is about 10-5. 
Discarded Packets: On evaluation phase, Snort and SPADE has been used to 
search intrusions in IDEVAL data for evaluating detection rates. The same procedure 
was also applied to IDEVAL data. During inspection Snort discarded 18 packets in our 
dataset. However Snort did not discard any packets when inspecting IDEVAL data. 
Snort discards only packets which could not be parsed. Reasons for this behavior are not 
clear, malformed packets exist in our dataset. It is also unknown that whether this is a 
feature or possible bug of the dataset.  
Variety in Protocol Usage: IDEVAL dataset has only GET commands in HTTP 
conversations. However this is unrealistic when compared to our results. There are other 
commands used, even much less frequent, such as POST, HEAD, OPTIONS, 
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PROPLINK, PUT and CONNECT. In addition, available protocol versions are 1.0 and 
1.1, this due to the fact that our data is recorded in 2006. 
 
6.1.3. Comparison with FIT Dataset 
 
Dataset used in (Mahoney, 2003b) has been collected from a departmental 
server, which served web pages and several accounts. Dataset was collected in 
weekdays over 10 week period. 
Our dataset was collected using feature of the network switch; this helped 
monitoring more than one server in dataset. Department server is said to be behind a 
firewall, providing additional protection for probes coming from external probes and 
possible exploit attempts. Our dataset has more probes and brute force attacks included. 
For HTTP traffic our observations are similar, more keywords for HTTP exist: 
FIT group has experienced more values for http commands in their dataset, 
found 9 commands in data (GET, HEAD, POST, OPTIONS, PROPFIND, LINK and 
two malformed) where GET is dominant over others by 99%. We have observed PUT 
and CONNECT commands as different commands but not observed any LINK in 
199302 requests. 99% percent of commands were GET. 
Similar points and significant differences between three datasets are discussed. 
Two of these datasets were collected from real networks. Since second real traffic 
dataset was not publicly available, only source of information has been used for 
comparison. Third dataset, IDEVAL, was other available dataset but differed from other 
two, because of its synthetic nature. 
 
6.2. Results of Demonstration of Algorithms 
 
In this study, performance of two anomaly detection algorithms, one as a 
standalone implementation, one as a preprocessor plug-in integrated with Snort was 
demonstrated. In original study of (Mahoney and Chan 2001), results were promising 
but on further studies it was revealed that results could be misleading because of 
existing artifacts in simulation (Mahoney and Chan 2003b) – which could hide real 
performance of algorithms and systems.  
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IDEVAL 99 data set has been the most comprehensive and publicly available 
work in evaluation of intrusion detection systems. Dataset included real attacks on 
hosts, with simulated background traffic, created with statistical information from real 
production environments. Further studies showed that there are issues with possible 
bugs, probably caused by idiosyncrasies of simulation. There are problems with its 
nature and structure of its compatibility of modern internets. Statistical data used for 
IDEVAL sets belonged to 1997, compatible with its time, but not with today’s network 
trends and traffic. New trends, technologies and threats have emerged by time after 
1997, but nature of this dataset prevents development of anomaly detection algorithms 
which will fit with today’s world.  
For evaluation of algorithms in a real network environment, network traffic data 
was collected from servers of our university. Collected data has shown significant 
differences with simulated data. Real dataset contained real attacks distributed into data, 
making it harder to use with clean-data sensitive algorithms. This is a certain 
disadvantage for systems with learning based approaches. Reducing number of these 
attacks may be succeeded with more restrictive firewall and network usage policies.  
SPADE algorithm, integrated and evaluated with Snort, had difficulties in 
detecting intrusions, producing so many alerts, some of which were false alarms. False 
alarms of Snort came from http-inspect preprocessor, which comes with standard 
package and is started with Snort by default. It produced false alerts on requests of files 
which included letters encoded in URL format (e.g. using “%20” instead of space 
character), which contains characters found in Turkish alphabet and not in English 
alphabet, such as ğ, ş and İ. Another preprocessor named portscan also produced 
relatively higher amount of false alerts, which is thought to be related for being untuned. 
Snort rules were configured to run with minimum changes, closer to default 
configuration. Snort and other intrusion detection systems need monitoring and 
modifications from default configuration when deployed in real environment. This may 
be thought as a form of training to reduce number of false alerts.  
SPADE is a useful tool, especially for detecting probes to unusual ports. 
However it has a serious flaw: it has no correlation mechanism between events in a time 
window, but portscan has. For example, when a probing event occurs for x ports on y 
machines, SPADE will produce (x*y) alerts if all packets are over defined threshold 
level. A similar tool, port-scan preprocessor has correlation capability and will produce 
only one alert for this probing activity. Approach of port-scan detector is better than 
  52
SPADE in detection of closed ports, even though alerts were overlapped in evaluation. 
Spade produced many alerts in evaluation with both datasets. In availability of port-scan 
preprocessor, closed-dport detector is not necessary. 
PHAD algorithm was evaluated after Snort and SPADE. Special modifications 
were made on original code. PHAD had problems in evaluation with real time data. 
PHAD algorithm failed to fit test environment due to its rigidity and tight bounds to 
underlying structure. Another reason is duration and difference of training data.  
 
6.2.1. Snort and SPADE on IDEVAL 
 
Snort and SPADE data has been used to test IDEVAL data. It is aimed to 
estimate detection and false alarm rates on following configuration. Snort and SPADE 
settings of this test have been explained in 5.1.3.1. Snort and SPADE records all alerts 
into one single text file. Evaluation of detection rate is made using EVAL where all alert 
data must be entered in form: 
 
  ID   Date    Time   Victim IP   Alarm Score  Comment 
0 03/29/1999 14:33:12 170.70.71.73  0.854322 # notes 
 
ID value has no specific meaning and is ignored in evaluation; date is given in 
MM/DD/YYYY format; victim’s IP address in dotted decimal notation. Alarm score 
determines certainty of attack. Higher alarm score means, this activity has higher 
probability of being hostile. Alarm score starts from 0. Attacks are reported in Eastern 
Standard Time (EST) for first four weeks. Valid time zone for fifth week is Eastern 
Daylight Time. For converting snort alert files into sim format, all alarms were given 
alarm score 1.000000. 
Snort alert files were processed using a conversion program to be compatible 
with input format of described above and daily alert outputs were converted to sim files. 
Each alert were given score 1.000000. On first evaluation, each sim file was evaluated 
separately using EVAL. In second evaluation, all created sim files were merged into a 
larger file. The merged sim file was used for evaluation with EVAL, in second 
evaluation step. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 shows number of true detections and alerts for 
training and test weeks. Figure 6.7 shows Detections/False Alarms Threshold Level 
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curve created for detection rates of Snort and SPADE with different tolerance of false 
alarms.  
 
Table 6.2. Number of alerts, true detections and packets  
                                            in training data 
 
Week/Day Alerts Attacks Detections Packets 
W 1 / D1 220 0 0 1.495.808 
W 1 / D2 274 0 0 1.240.260 
W 1 / D3 563 0 0 1.730.292 
W 1 / D4 476 0 0 1.951.904 
W 1 / D5 605 0 0 1.487.186 
W 2 / D1 915 7 0 1.755.742 
W 2 / D2 3965 9 2 1.588.037 
W 2 / D3 11194 6 0 1.014.119 
W 2 / D4 18760 9 1 1.566.930 
W 2 / D5 17487 12 0 1.365.264 
W3 / D1 590 0 0 2.110.223 
W3 / D2 762 0 0 1.834.417 
W3 / D3 949 0 0 1.853.383 
W3 / D4 872 0 0 1.562.141 
W3 / D5 858 0 0 1.638.336 
W3 / D6 981 0 0 1.683.381 
W3 / D7 332 0 0 2.157.318 
Total  43 3  
 
 
Table 6.3.Number of alerts, true detections and packets  
                                           in test data 
 
Week/Day Alerts Attacks Detections Packets 
W4 / D1 297 17 3 1.651.481 
W4 / D2 0 12 0 0 
W4 / D3 1134 19 6 1.768.940 
W4 / D4 1220 10 3 2.359.214 
W4 / D5 1119 17 3 1.949.641 
W5 / D1 5776 27 12 2.294.746 
W5 / D2 7456 25 10 3.407.858 
W5 / D3 1656 17 10 2.091.431 
W5 / D4 13567 21 15 3.205.259 
W5 / D5 1246 32 16 3.397.462 
  197 78  
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Figure 6.7.Detection/False Alarm Threshold Level Curve for test weeks of  
                            Snort and SPADE 
 
6.2.2. Snort and SPADE on IZTECH Data 
 
Snort and SPADE has been used to detect intrusions on real time dataset. Snort 
and SPADE’s alerts are shown in Table 6.4. Alerts are grouped to show SPADE’s 
effect. Ratio of SPADE column shows alert groups created by SPADE to all alert 
groups ratio. 
 
Table 6.4.Top alerts and ratio of SPADE related alerts in total groups of alerts 
 
Day Part Packets Alerts Top Alert  Top Alert Definition Ratio of SPADE 
6 1 1.582.906 391 29 robots.txt 235/256 
6 2 502 0 0   
6 3 1.482.899 1079 440 ICMP Ping 224/252 
  3.066.307     
7 1 2.779.952 1961 144 robots.txt 650/678 
7 2 1.354.134 526 111 SPADE 207/226 
7 3 1.379.683 373 26 robots.txt 177/200 
7 4 388.390 155 45 robots.txt 36/55 
  5.902.159     
8 1 2.411.406 726 190 robots.txt 175/208 
8 2 775.667 292 73 robots.txt 90/116 
  3.187.073     
9 1 2.527.108 74836 4657 SPADE 281/319 
9 2 1.343.585 184 61 robots.txt 41/63 
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9 3 151.694 48 21 robots.txt  3 / 14 
  4.022.387     
10 1 1.995.399 2059 757 SPADE 324/352 
10 2 2.523.863 2774 761 SPADE 244/273 
10 3 1.377.922 217 49 SPADE 44/59 
10 4 1.537.600 53 6 SPADE 20/28 
10 5 881.384 682 86 robots.txt 79/111 
  8.316.168     
11 1 1.478.832 591 112 robots.txt 153/183 
11 2 2.878.084 3230 814 SPADE 476/506 
11 3 924.230 822 218 SPADE 149/180 
  5.281.146     
12 1 1.424.997 780 165 SPADE 137/162 
12 2 2.733.034 1035 115 SPADE 349/375 
12 3 1.362.016 805 164 SPADE 126/150 
  5.520.047     
13 1 690.701 319 97 robots.txt 34/54 
13 2 1.864.309 399 59 SPADE 148/168 
13 3 2.589.204 26 6 robots.txt 5 /17 
13 4 2.342.495 174 25 ping 48/72 
13 5 2.002.180 429 128 SPADE 111/134 
13 6 2.202.247 333 113 SPADE 64/76 
13 7 1.654.141 6515 5854 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 80/106 
  13.345.277     
14 1 664.181 32409 32227 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 80/108 
14 2 2.161.180 44526 43457 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 17/37 
14 3 3.267.559 18025 16359 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 235/260 
14 4 2.127.386 1081 1045 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 486/515 
14 5 1.902.083 52803 51927 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 15/28 
  10.122.389  145015    
15 1 1.257.635 66032 64564 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 39/63 
15 2 2.507.106 71781 71190 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 40/69 
15 3 1.566.383 71286 70187 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 105/134 
  5.331.124  205941    
16 1 3.828.679 145537 144418 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 104/137 
16 2 1.313.619 59731 58400 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 91/115 
  5.142.298  202818    
17 1 2.332.617 89260 87729 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 351/372 
17 2 2.715.846 14265 13050 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 511/536 
17 3 183.172 3080 3044 MYSQL 4.0 root login attempt 15/28 
  5.231.635  103823   
  74.468.010     
 
Alerts were grouped according to their names and SPADE groups were also 
grouped according to created anomaly scores. This is the main reason of SPADE alert 
groups. These alerts are created when a probing event occurs either by a human or by a 
worm. Combinations of IP addresses and port numbers result with many alert groups 
with relatively low population.  
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6.2.3. Anomaly Detection Algorithms on Iztech Data 
 
6.2.3.1. PHAD 
 
 Original PHAD source code could not handle Tcpdump files stored on a PC, 
modifications were made to solve this problem (modified version will be referred as 
PHADm from now on). First PHADm run used Week 3 of IDEVAL data for training 
and a sample from data set for test. It resulted with 99996 anomalies. 4 of top 5 fields 
for anomalies belonged to Ethernet protocol header. In second run, in order to include 
into traffic from our institute, clean data from our dataset has been added to evaluation. 
PHADm also included part of real network data for evaluation. On third trial, real and 
synthetic data have been used to train system and real time data to test. Both evaluations 
resulted with fewer number of alerts but still very high. Total number of reported 
anomalies was more than 20000. Alerts in high numbers have shown that this algorithm 
is sensitive to amount of training and significant changes in underlying network 
structure. 
 
6.2.3.2. ALAD 
 
ALAD, even though used a different method of anomaly calculation, it is not 
evaluated due to problems occurred in evaluation of PHAD. 
 
6.2.3.3. LERAD 
 
LERAD algorithm relies on data provided by interim-data created for evaluation 
of ALAD. Cancellation of ALAD evaluation also cancels LERAD evaluation because 
of similar algorithmic handicap and lack of usable data.  
 
6.2.3.4. NETAD 
 
NETAD algorithm evaluation did not happen due to limited time and similar 
algorithmic handicaps for successful evaluation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this study five anomaly detection algorithms (PHAD, ALAD, LERAD, 
NETAD and SPADE) and Snort, a commercial signature based intrusion detection 
system, is introduced.  
In first step of demonstration, Snort and SPADE were tested on synthetic 
IDEVAL dataset. After that they were used to test real network traffic data collected 
from servers of our university. PHAD was also used to test these data for intrusions.  
Collected network traffic data contained various attacks distributed into samples 
and a few attack waves which last longer than other attacks. Since Snort and Spade were 
not affected underlying structure or content of the network, demonstration has been 
completed. However PHAD algorithm required clean training data obtained from the 
network which it is deployed. This type of data was not available in large amounts, so 
the process ended with many false alerts, a sign of tight bounds between algorithm and 
structure and content of the network. Demonstration of other algorithms in real traffic 
was cancelled because of similar algorithmic background.  
SPADE has proven to be useful for detecting port scans but has a serious lack of 
event correlation ability. Performance of the selected detector of SPADE has been 
superseded by default port-scan preprocessor plug-in of Snort package. Not all detected 
probes of SPADE and port-scan overlap each other, thus providing more information on 
activities missed by other detector. SPADE has been more informative and precise on 
scanned ports than port-scan. 
As future work, evaluation of these algorithms may be performed with more real 
attack-free training data. Demonstrating performance of other detectors of SPADE may 
be added to the overall process. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
FIELDS OF LOWER LAYER PROTOCOL HEADERS 
 
 
 Five anomaly detection algorithms covered in Chapter 4 use different fields on 
lower layer protocols. These fields in lower layer protocols and their order in packet 
payloads are provided in the following figures 
 
 
 
Fig. A.1.Fields of Ethernet Packet  
                                 (Redrawn, Original source: Stevens 1994) 
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Fig. A.2.Fields of IP Header  
                    (Source: Stevens 1994) 
 
 
 
Fig. A.3.Fields of TCP Header  
               (Source: Stevens 1994) 
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Fig. A.4.Fields of UDP Header  
               (Source: Stevens 1994) 
 
 
 
Fig.A.5.ICMP Header  
                                                (Redrawn, Original source: Stevens 1994) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
LIST OF DATA FILES 
 
 
Table B.1 shows list of available data files. File names have no extension. Data files of 
the same day are grouped and summed in empty line after each group. 
 
Table B.1. List of tcpdump data files collected by Snort 
 
 File Name Starts at (* Real time) Ends at (* Real time) Length(MB) 
1 snort-tcpdump-6-1 Thu Apr 6 14:32:14  Thu Apr 6 16:38:18  1.200,00 
2 snort-tcpdump-6-2 Thu Apr 6 16:38:36  Thu Apr 6 16:38:46  0,09 
3 snort-tcpdump-6-3 Thu Apr 6 16:38:58  Thu Apr 6 23:59:59  783,50 
    1.983,59 
     
4 snort-tcpdump-7-1 Fri Apr 7 00:00:00  Fri Apr 7 14:26:42  1.200,00 
5 snort-tcpdump-7-2 Fri Apr 7 15:16:41  Fri Apr 7 16:25:01  1.100,00 
6 snort-tcpdump-7-3 Fri Apr 7 16:25:01  Fri Apr 7 20:00:01  954,80 
7 snort-tcpdump-7-4 Fri Apr 7 20:00:01  Fri Apr 7 23:59:59  128,30 
    3.383,10 
     
8 snort-tcpdump-8-1 Sat Apr 8 00:00:00  Sat Apr 8 16:40:01  1.300,00 
9 snort-tcpdump-8-2 Sat Apr 8 16:40:01  Sat Apr 8 23:59:59  305,70 
    1.605,70 
     
10 snort-tcpdump-9-1 Sun Apr 9 00:00:00  Sun Apr 9 16:30:01  1.300,00 
11 snort-tcpdump-9-2 Sun Apr 9 16:30:02  Sun Apr 9 22:20:01  979,50 
12 snort-tcpdump-9-3 Sun Apr 9 22:20:02  Sun Apr 9 23:59:59  59,20 
    2.338,70 
     
13 snort-tcpdump-10-1 Mon Apr 10 00:00:00  Mon Apr 10 11:20:01  947,10 
14 snort-tcpdump-10-2 Mon Apr 10 11:20:01  Mon Apr 10 16:30:01  1.600,00 
15 snort-tcpdump-10-3 Mon Apr 10 16:30:01  Mon Apr 10 17:10:01  1.200,00 
16 snort-tcpdump-10-4 Mon Apr 10 17:10:01  Mon Apr 10 17:20:01  1.400,00 
17 snort-tcpdump-10-5 Mon Apr 10 17:20:01  Mon Apr 10 23:59:59  371,10 
    5.518,20 
     
18 snort-tcpdump-11-1 Tue Apr 11 00:00:00  Tue Apr 11 10:10:01  784,20 
19 snort-tcpdump-11-2 Tue Apr 11 10:10:01  Tue Apr 11 16:40:01  1.800,00 
20 snort-tcpdump-11-3 Tue Apr 11 16:40:02  Tue Apr 11 23:59:59  331,00 
    2.915,20 
     
21 snort-tcpdump-12-1 Wed Apr 12 00:00:00  Wed Apr 12 10:40:01  637,00 
22 snort-tcpdump-12-2 Wed Apr 12 10:40:01  Wed Apr 12 16:30:01  1.800,00 
23 snort-tcpdump-12-3 Wed Apr 12 16:30:01  Wed Apr 12 23:59:59  741,90 
    3.178,90 
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 File Name Starts at (* Real time) Ends at (* Real time) Length(MB) 
24 snort-tcpdump-13-1 Thu Apr 13 00:00:00  Thu Apr 13 08:50:01  214,40 
25 snort-tcpdump-13-2 Thu Apr 13 08:50:01  Thu Apr 13 12:20:01  1.016,80 
26 snort-tcpdump-13-3 Thu Apr 13 12:20:01  Thu Apr 13 12:40:01  1.300,00 
27 snort-tcpdump-13-4 Thu Apr 13 12:40:01  Thu Apr 13 14:10:01  1.500,00 
28 snort-tcpdump-13-5 Thu Apr 13 14:10:01  Thu Apr 13 16:00:01  1.200,00 
29 snort-tcpdump-13-6 Thu Apr 13 16:00:01  Thu Apr 13 16:30:01  1.500,00 
30 snort-tcpdump-13-7 Thu Apr 13 16:30:01  Thu Apr 13 23:59:59  849,30 
    7.580,50 
     
31 snort-tcpdump-14-1 Fri Apr 14 00:00:00  Fri Apr 14 04:00:01  105,20 
32 snort-tcpdump-14-2 Fri Apr 14 04:00:01  Fri Apr 14 10:50:01  1.000,00 
33 snort-tcpdump-14-3 Fri Apr 14 10:50:01  Fri Apr 14 16:10:01  1.500,00 
34 snort-tcpdump-14-4 Fri Apr 14 16:10:02  Fri Apr 14 16:40:01  1.500,00 
35 snort-tcpdump-14-5 Fri Apr 14 16:40:01  Fri Apr 14 23:59:59  787,70 
    4.892,90 
     
36 snort-tcpdump-15-1 Sat Apr 15 00:00:00  Sat Apr 15 08:00:01  170,60 
37 snort-tcpdump-15-2 Sat Apr 15 08:00:01  Sat Apr 15 16:30:01  1.200,00 
38 snort-tcpdump-15-3 Sat Apr 15 16:30:01  Sat Apr 15 23:59:59  355,40 
    1.726,00 
     
39 snort-tcpdump-16-1 Sun Apr 16 00:00:00  Sun Apr 16 16:30:01  1.300,00 
40 snort-tcpdump-16-2 Sun Apr 16 16:30:01  Sun Apr 16 23:59:59  287,70 
    1.587,70 
     
41 snort-tcpdump-17-1 Mon Apr 17 00:00:00  Mon Apr 17 11:00:01  668,30 
42 snort-tcpdump-17-2 Mon Apr 17 11:00:01  Mon Apr 17 16:40:01  1.700,00 
43 snort-tcpdump-17-3 Mon Apr 17 16:40:01  Mon Apr 17 17:14:16  77,30 
    2.445,60 
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APPENDIX C 
 
CONTENTS OF CD 
 
 
root directory:  
    binaries (dir) 
    extras (dir) 
    TITLE.doc 
    original (dir) 
    programs (dir) 
    README.txt  
    sources (dir) 
    TABLE OF CONTENTS.doc 
    THESIS.doc 
 
binaries directory: 
    ethereal-0.99.0-fc4.1.i386.rpm 
    ethereal-gnome-0.99.0-fc4.1.i386.rpm 
    Files.txt 
    libnet10-1.0.2a-8.fc4.i386.rpm 
    libpcap-0.8.3-14.FC4.i386.rpm 
    pcre-5.0-4.1.fc4.i386.rpm 
    pcre-devel-5.0-4.1.fc4.i386.rpm 
    snort-2.4.4-3.fc4.i386.rpm 
    tcpdump-3.8.2-14.FC4.i386.rpm 
    unrar-3.5.4-0.lvn.1.4.i386.rpm 
 
 extras directory: 
     snortrules-snapshot-CURRENT.tar.gz 
     tarihler.iztech.txt 
     tethereal.manual.txt 
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original directory: 
    a2l.txt 
    alad.txt 
    eval.cpp 
    IDS Distribution.htm 
    lerad.cpp 
    leradp.cpp 
    netad.cpp 
    phad.cpp 
    sad.cpp 
    te.cpp 
    tf.cpp 
 
programs directory: 
    Files.txt 
    libpcap-0.9.4.tar.gz 
    snort-2.4.4.tar.gz 
    spade.tar.gz 
    tcpdump-3.9.4.tar.gz 
    tcpslice-1.1a3.tar.gz 
    tcpslice_mod.tar.gz 
 
sources directory: 
    doopen-final.sh 
    Files.txt 
    generate-final.sh 
    Makefile 
    myenhtest-final.pl 
    mytest2-final.pl 
    phadm.cpp 
    pssum-final.c 
    saviour-final.sh 
    savioursliced-final.sh 
